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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
RICHARD JOSEPH GARCIA, : Case No. 20050272-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of two counts of Distributing or 
Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance, to wit methamphetamine, a 
Second-degree felony in violation of U.C.A.§ 58-37-8 . This court has jurisdiction 
over this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2A-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO GRANT 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF 
GUILTY? 
PRESERVATION: This issue was properly preserved for appeal by the 
timely filing of a motion to withdraw his plea which was denied. (R.37-38) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Court in the case of State v. Mora, (2003 
Ut App 117 f 16) has held: "The 'withdrawal of a plea of guilty is a privilege, not a 
right. . . [and] is within the sound discretion of the trial court.' State v. Gallegos, 
738 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah 1987). Thus, '[w]e review a trial court's denial of a 
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motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard.' State v. 
Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993)." 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts - Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, 
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or 
arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in any 
violation of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a 
felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of 
Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are 
undertaken in concert with five or more persons with respect to whom the person 
occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance analog, or 
gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a second degree 
felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree 
felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third 
degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second 
degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor and 
upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or 
(iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by 
law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 76-10-501 was 
used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his immediate possession during the 
commission or in furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally sentence 
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the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first 
degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less 
than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the 
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled 
substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid 
prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, 
tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to 
permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or 
distributing controlled substances in any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged 
prescription or written order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree 
felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is more 
than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is 
guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from any 
part of the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent 
to a conviction under Subsection (l)(a), that person shall be sentenced to a one-
degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including 
less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a 
second conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon a third 
or subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the 
exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in 
Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be sentenced 
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to a penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b), and if the 
conviction is with respect to controlled substances as listed in: 
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term as provided by law, and: 
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of one 
year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and 
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence 
the person convicted to a term of six months to run consecutively and not 
concurrently. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (4)(c) who, in an 
offense not amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207: 
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in his 
body any measurable amount of a controlled substance; and 
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent 
manner, causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the death 
of another. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled 
substance a 
license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person 
or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or 
represent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, 
veterinarian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the 
administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any 
person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or to procure the 
administration of any controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure by the 
person to disclose his receiving any controlled substance from another source, 
fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order 
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
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(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled 
substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or written order issued 
or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing 
designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other 
identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of any of the 
foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to render any drug a 
counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D ~ Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized 
under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, 
Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 
37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to the 
penalties and classifications under this Subsection (4) if the trier of fact finds the 
act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of 
any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on 
the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or 
grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or 
through a school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10-501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, 
playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in 
Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii); 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, 
regardless of where the act occurs; or 
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, delivery, 
or distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an inmate or on the 
grounds of any correctional facility as defined in Section 76-8-311.3. 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree 
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty 
that would otherwise have 
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been established but for this subsection would have been a first-degree felony. 
Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is 
not eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have 
been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted 
under Subsection (2)(g) or this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the 
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) (i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi): 
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as 
provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for 
a term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and 
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person who, 
acting with the mental state required for the commission of an offense, directly or 
indirectly solicits, requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or intentionally aids 
another person to commit a violation of Subsection (4)(a)(xi). 
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor 
mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the 
offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor mistakenly 
believed that the location where the act occurred was not as described in 
Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location where the act occurred was as 
described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another 
state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the 
same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which 
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or 
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the 
person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance or 
substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course 
of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, 
or administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be 
administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and supervision. 
6 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance for use as 
a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary 
course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of his 
employment. 
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any 
person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be 
given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; 
Rule 11(e) 
e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally 
ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) If the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly 
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right 
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an 
impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the 
prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and 
that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which 
the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of 
proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an 
admission of all those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes 
that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the 
defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution 
has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
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(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, 
the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for 
each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition 
of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, 
and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if 
used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established that 
the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the 
statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be 
sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire 
into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged in a two-count information filed November 1, 
2004, with the offense of Distribution or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled 
Substance in a Drug Free Zone, a first-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated §58-37-8. On November 1, 2004, the Defendant made an initial 
appearance and the information was read to him. On January 4, 2005, the 
Defendant waived his preliminary hearing and was arraigned on the charge. At that 
time the defendant entered into a plea negotiation in which he pled guilty to two 
counts of distribution of a controlled substance a second-degree felony. The drug 
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free zone language was stricken as part of the negotiation and the prosecutor 
agreed not to file another first-degree drug charge based on some illegal substances 
found in the defendant's home. 
The defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea and a hearing on 
that motion was held on March 1, 2005, at which time the trial court, Judge Pamela 
Heffernan denied the motion. On March 8, 2005, the Defendant was sentenced to 
an indeterminate term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison on both 
charges. The Judgment, Sentence and Commitment was filed on March 10, 2005. 
The prison term was commenced that day. 
The Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal on March 18, 2005. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Defendant was charged in a two-count information with two counts of 
Distribution or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance in a Drug Free 
Zone, a first-degree felony in violation of UCA §58-37-8. (R. 001) At the date set 
for the preliminary hearing the defendant entered into a plea negotiation in which 
the drug free zone language was stricken and the defendant pled guilty to two 
second-degree felonies. As part of the negotiation the prosecutor agreed not to file 
an additional first-degree felony charge. At the time of the plea, the defendant 
executed a document entitled "statement of the defendant in support of a guilty 
plea", which went through in detail all the Rule 11 issues(R. 21-26). The defendant 
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told the court that he had read the statement(R. 70 / 5) and that he understood that 
he would "be giving up [his] rights to trial" (R. 70 / 5). The trial court told the 
defendant that the statement "goes through in detail what your rights are, 
including, as you said, your right to a trial and a right to be represented by a lawyer 
at the trial, all the associated rights with that." (R. 70 / 5). The trial court also went 
through the possible maximum sentence that could be imposed, and the defendant 
stated in court that he was aware of these rights. (R. 70 / 5). The trial court 
incorporated the statement in support of guilty plea into the record. (R. 70 /5) The 
defendant subsequently and timely filed a motion to withdraw his plea and on 
March 1, 2005 a hearing was held on that motion. 
At that hearing the defendant admitted that he had read "word for word" the 
affidavit in support of a guilty plea (R. 70 / 13) and that he did not have any 
question about that document.(R. 70/14) He testified that the Judge had asked him 
if he had any questions about the plea and he told her that he did not have any 
questions (R.70 / 14). He also stated that trial counsel did not force him to plead 
guilty, but that he was coerced (R. 70/14) 
The only contention that the defendant raised was that he believed that the 
unfiled charge may have had some constitutional issues that were not raised by 
trial counsel.(R. 70 / 16). The defendant did acknowledge that he received the 
reduction of the charges from first degree to second degree (R. 70 /15). 
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The defendant's plea attorney Martin Gravis testified that he had gone over 
issues with the defendant prior to his entering his plea. He testified that he believed 
that since the two charged felonies were controlled buys that there would have 
been no suppression issues to raise (R. 70 / 34). He testified that although there 
may have been some issues on the search of the defendant's home, those issues 
would apply only to the unfiled felony, and would be of no help to the two charged 
felonies (R. 70 / 34). He also testified that he believed that the defendant knew and 
understood what he was pleading guilty to and had no questions at the time of plea 
(R. 70 / 34, 35). 
After hearing the evidence at the hearing, Judge Heffeman ruled that the 
defendant was represented by competent counsel(R. 7 0 / 4 1 ) and had knowingly 
entered his plea (R. 70 / 42). She found that he had read and understood the plea 
agreement and understood by pleading guilty he was giving up certain rights, and 
that he received a benefit of the bargain (R. 70 / 42, 43). Based on those finding, 
the court denied the defendant's motion (R. 70 / 43) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The determinative issue of the Defendant on appeal is whether the trial court 
improperly denied the Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Based upon 
the Rule 11 colloquy conducted at the plea hearing, and based upon the fact that 
the defendant executed and acknowledged reading and understanding the statement 
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in support of guilty plea document, the trial court properly followed the 
requirements of Rule 11. 
After having reviewed the case law together with all these factors, defense 
counsel has been unable to find any non-frivolous issues to appeal. For this 
reason, this brief is being filed in accordance with the guidelines set forth in 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d (Utah 
1981). 
ARGUMENT 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Rule 11(e) provides a guideline that a 
trial court must follow in the taking of a plea of guilty. The application of this Rule 
has been held by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah to require strict 
compliance. In the case of State v. Ostler, 996 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Ut. Ct. App. 2000) 
the Court held: 
"Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that 
constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when a 
guilty plea is entered." State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (quoting 
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987)). The trial court 
must strictly adhere to Rule 11(e). See State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 
371, 372 (Utah 1996). (emphasis added) 
This "strict compliance" requirement replaced the former "substantial 
compliance" requirement before a plea can be taken. (See State v. Thurman, 911 
P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996) where the Court held, "Gibbons created a 'strict 
12 
compliance' rule requiring that a trial court 'personally establish... that the 
defendant... understood the elements of the crime'".) 
The Rule 11 colloquy utilized during the taking of a plea of guilty must 
establish this "strict compliance" for each element of the plea. Although the extent 
of this strict compliance requirement has been recently reviewed by the Utah 
Supreme Court in the cases of State v. Dean, 95 P.3d 276 (Utah 2004) and State v. 
Corwell, 114 P.3d 569 (Utah 2005), the requirement that the court taking a plea of 
guilty remains one of strict compliance. In determining whether each of these Rule 
11 requirements were appropriately adhered to in the case at bar it is necessary to 
review each element in conjunction with the trial court's efforts at compliance. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11(e) provides " The court may 
refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not 
accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) If the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has 
knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, 
the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy 
public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-
examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel 
the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, 
these rights are waived; 
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the 
offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution 
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would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those 
elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if 
it establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the 
defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit 
culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a 
substantial risk of conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and 
if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum 
sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is 
entered, including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive 
sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any 
motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the 
record or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the 
court has established that the defendant has read, understood, and 
acknowledged the contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot 
understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the 
statement has been read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required 
to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a 
plea, (emphasis added) 
In the case at bar the defendant read and executed a statement in 
support of a guilty plea, (see Addendum B) That document clearly addressed 
each of the above elements of Rule 11 in great detail. The trial court asked 
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the defendant if he understood his rights and the defendant told the court that 
he had read the statement(R. 7 0 / 5 ) and that he understood that he would 
"be giving up [his] rights to trial" (R. 70 / 5). The trial court then told the 
defendant that the statement in support of guilty plea "goes through in detail 
what your rights are, including, as you said, your right to a trial and a right to 
be represented by a lawyer at the trial, all the associated rights with that." (R. 
70 / 5). 
The trial court then asked the prosecutor to recite a factual basis for 
the plea which is as follows: 
On October 20th, 2004, officers from NUCAT sent in a confidential 
informant to purchase methamphetamine from the defendant. The 
defendant sold the confidential [informant] methamphetamine. It 
tested positive as meth. And then again on October 24th of 2004, they 
did the same thing. Again, the confidential informant turned over 
methamphetamine to the officers that tested positive. And the 
defendant was later interviewed after the execution of the search 
warrant on his home where additional narcotics were found inside the 
home. The defendant at that time admitted that he had been 
distributing drugs. (R. 70 / 7) 
The trial court also went through the possible maximum sentence that could 
be imposed, and the defendant stated in court that he was aware of these rights. (R. 
70 / 5). The trial court incorporated the statement in support of guilty plea into the 
record. (R. 70 / 5) 
At a hearing on the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea the trial 
court found that all Rule 11 requirements had been met, that the defendant knew 
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and understood his rights at the time of the plea, and that the defendant had 
knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty pleas. 
The only issue the defendant wanted appealed, and under the circumstances, 
the only issue the defendant could appeal, was the voluntariness of the entry of his 
guilty plea. Since all the Rule 11 requirements were followed, and since the 
defendant admitted in the hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea, that he 
understood his rights there are no possible violations on which to appeal. For these 
reasons, counsel respectfully requests permission to withdraw from further 
representation of the defendant. 
Counsel has complied with the requirements set forth in Anders v. 
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981). 
Defendant was been mailed a copy of this brief more than thirty days ago and has 
responded to that request with a four page letter received at appellate counsel's 
office on August 25, 2005. In that letter the defendant claims that he believed that 
upon reviewing the discovery in his case he believed that there were several facts 
that would "support a feasible jury trial". He then goes through some of these facts 
in his letter concluding that he believes he would have a chance to win a jury trial 
if the case were to go to trial. 
The only claim that the defendant makes regarding a knowing and intelligent 
entry of plea is a claim that he was "coerced by the prosecution with a separate five 
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to live [first-degree felony]." He does not claim that he was under the influence of 
any kind of drug or alcohol nor that he was not of a right mind or that the plea was 
involuntary. His claim that the plea was coerced by a separate first-degree felony 
charge was in fact part of the plea negotiation in which the State agreed not to file 
a first-degree felony drug charge against the defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
Counsel is unable to find any non-frivolous issues to appeal. For this reason, 
counsel respectfully requests this Court to release him as appellate counsel. 
DATED t h i s / | day of September, 2005 
Attjorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Mark 
Shurtleff, Attorney General, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 160 East 300 South, 6th 
Floor PO Box 140854 SLC, Utah 84114-0180, postage prepaicj this j3day of 
September, 2005. ) / . • > . . 1 1 
. :¥m« 
/ 
^.Q41^Xrr 
ANDALL W. JUCHARDS 
Attorney at Law 
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ADDENDUM A 
FILE COPY 
THE PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, INC. 
OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
APPELLATE DIVISION 
2550 Washington Boulevard, Suite 300 
Randall W. Richards Ogden, Utah 84401 
Dee W. Smith Telephone: (801)399-4191 
August 8, 2005 
Richard Joseph Garcia 
Inmate No. 21187 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT 84020 
Re: SOU v. Richard Joseph Garcia 
Dear Mr. Garcia, 
I have been working on your appeal, and have done extensive research regarding your 
complaint that the Judge should not have sentenced you to prison. I have not been able to find 
any cases to support our position on this issue. The problem is that where you testified at the 
hearing to withdraw your plea that you had read every word of the plea bargain agreement and 
fully understood it, the Judge had no legal reason to allow your plea to be withdrawn. The fact 
that you may have had a question about an illegal search in an unfiled case, does not rise to the 
level required to withdraw a plea which would be that you did not knowingly enter the plea. 
The Utah Appellate Courts will not change a judge's decision on this issue unless it is so 
obvious that you did not know the rights you were giving up when you entered the plea. 
I am filing a brief saying that I can find no issue for an appeal. I have enclosed a copy of 
that brief for your inspection. If you have any other issues you would like discussed on 
appeal, please bring them to my attention within 30 days of the date of this letter. If I do 
not hear from you on further issues, I will submit the brief to the Court of Appeals unchanged. 
Attorney at Law 
RWR/mm 
Enclosure 
ADDENDUM B 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Case No. QLf /fOCc^^ 
Judge 
I, _, hereby acknowledge and certify that T have been 
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights; 
NOTIFICATION OF CHARGES 
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes: 
CRIME & STATUTORY DEGREE 
PROVISION 
PUNISHMENT 
MIN/MAX AND/OR 
MINIMUM MANDATORY 
A. 
B. 
C 
D. 
-2 /OlS-/Y*£-rfW- c:H ?° /A/S" 
£*~ 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or had it 
read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading 
guilty (or no contest). 
n?i 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are: 
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I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed 
above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the foregoing 
crimes.) I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do no dispute or contest) that the 
following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally 
liable. These facts provide a basis for the Court to accept my guilty (or no contest) pleas and 
prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest): 
<>c: r t*l*j\ 
WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ^ 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under 
the constitutions of Utah and the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty (or no 
contest) I will give up all the following rights: 
COUNSEL: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I 
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the Court at no cost to me. I understand that I 
might later, if the Judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's 
service to me. 
i^have not) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel, I 
have doneWknowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
n?2 
If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that I 
understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty (or 
no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my 
guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is / / A , i /f ^ t Crg v- k \ 
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my 
guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
JURY TRIAL, I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest). 
CONFRONTATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. I know that if I were to 
have a jury trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against 
me and b) by attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity 
to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
RIGHT TO COMPEL WITNESSES. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call 
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and 
testimony of the witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State 
would pay those costs. 
RIGHT TO TESTIFY AND PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. I know that if I 
were to have a jury trial. I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I 
chose not to testify, no on could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I 
also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal 
to testify against me. 
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF. I know that if I do not plead 
guilty (or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the 
charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty" and 
my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each 
element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must 
be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of innocence 
and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
APPEAL. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, 
I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an 
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that J am giving up my right to 
appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the 
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
0°3 
CONSEQUENCES OF ENTERING A GUILTY (OR NO CONTEST) PLEA 
POTENTIAL PENALTIES. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each 
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no 
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a 
mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eight-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. I 
also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any 
restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement. 
CONSECUTIVE/CONCURRENT PRISON TERMS. I know that if there is more than one 
crime involved, the sentence may be imposed one after the other (consecutively), or they may run 
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime 
that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another 
offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or 
no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense 
to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law 
requires the Court to impose consecutive sentences unless the Court finds and states on the 
record that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate. 
PLEA BARGAIN: My guilty (or no contest) plea(s)(is/are not) the result of a plea bargain 
between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea 
bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those explained below: 
A,y-S <> W^vcEL- M,- •. 1 ^ - * ~-V*-«-r - k A,/<>; / ruJL- i , f r ' ^—^ ( h k-e 
\A c p c .s v T~ v c^ - r — <; +-.<—?,\- ^.v....,^ i ^•'•-. 
TRIAL JUDGE NOT BOUND. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for 
sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecution attorney are not binding 
on the Judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the Judge 
may do are not binding on the Judge. 
DEFENDANT'S CERTIFICATION OF VOLUNTARINESS 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats or unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand its 
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contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete 
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the 
statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I am J? I years of age. I have attended school through the / / Grade. I can read and 
understand the English Language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been 
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which 
would impair my judgement when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the 
influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgement 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental 
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or 
from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must file a 
written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I will be allowed to 
withdraw my plea only if I show good cause. I will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after 
sentencing for any reason. 
DATED this V day of J ^ w ^ . r ^ 200
 X
J 
ft>/w)/fflr^A 
DEFENDANT 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for , the defendant 
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have 
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents 
and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an 
appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's 
criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other representations and 
declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true. 
S ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
B A R N O . / ^ 5 / 7 
0?5 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against f\{CJl^ro JflS^pfr 
ffiApMol , defendant. I have reviewed this statement of defendant and find that 
the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true and 
correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered 
defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea 
Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to 
believe that the evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which 
the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest 
ORDER 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and base on any oral representations in Court, the Court witnesses the 
signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, knowingly, and 
voluntarily made. 
I T IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest)vi)lea(s) to the crime(s) 
set forth in the Statement be accepted^nd entered. J 
rj? n , / • ' 
DATED this ^ \ day of ,^T2? x^s^^e-*-. , 200_ 
DISTRICT COURT JUDG£ ^ 
0?6 
ADDENDUM C 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
RICHARD JOSEPH GARCIA, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
APP SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 041906083 FS 
Judge: PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN 
Date: March 8, 2005 
PRESENT 
Clerk: roxanneb 
Prosecutor: SANDRA CORP 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MICHAEL BOUWHUIS, PDA 
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: September 10, 1970 
Video 
Tape Number: H030805 Tape Count: 324 
CHARGES 
1. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S (amended) - 2nd Degree 
Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 01/04/2005 Guilty 
2. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S (amended) - 2nd Degree 
Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 01/04/2005 Guilty 
HEARING 
This is the time set for sentencing. Defendant is present in 
custody from the Weber County Jail. Defendant is represented by 
Michael Bouwhuis. The Court proceeds with sentencing. 
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Case No: 041906083 
Date: Mar 08, 2005 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO 
DIST C/S a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO 
DIST C/S a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The Court orders sentence imposed on each count to run concurrent 
with each other. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
The Court recommends defendant receive credit for time served while 
at the Weber County Jail. 
Dated this day of 
^MELA Q6S HEFFERNAN 
District Court Judge 
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